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One objective of this article is to present descriptive material
on the life-style of the new urban middle class in Taiwan,
particularly as it relates to women. This class, though still
relatively small, has been growing steadily over the past decade.
Taiwan is rapidly urbanizing, and the major cities have doubled
or even tripled in size in a fairly short time. The goal of the
government on Taiwan is to reach a level of 70% urbanization
of the population by 1980. The present new middle class is a
model for the predicted city life-style of an increasingly large
segment of the total Taiwan population, assuming that Taiwan
is able to continue on her present course of development.
By &dquo;new middle class&dquo; I refer to that segment of the work
force engaged in the modern sector of the economy. Their
household income, usually based on salary, derives from
employment in the professions, in governmental and private
corporations and bureaucracies at the administrative and mana-
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gerial level, and white-collar jobs. Their income ranges between
$100 and $300 a month in U S dollars. Those engaged in the
traditional sector of the economy (landlords, small family-
owned shops) are excluded here, regardless of income simi-
larities. Also excluded from our consideration are those in the
top echelons of the modern industrial economy and the
national government.
My second objective is to examine family-related values and
women’s roles in something beyond redundant cultural terms.
While the legacy of traditional Chinese culture plays some part
as &dquo;explanation&dquo; of the data, there is much to be gained by
additional lines of inquiry. I intend to look at Taiwan’s political
atmosphere and economic setting A working assumption of this
line of inquiry is that economic and political developments
impinge on and reshape culture and ideology. They affect
family organization and size and household relationships. They
affect the content of socialization, in the wider sense of the
learning of values and behavioral guides through formal educa-
tion, the mass media, and in the realities of post-childhood
experiences. If we choose to ignore the developing political and
economic scene, we are reduced to explaining ongoing behaviors
and values either as continuities from the traditional past, real
or spurious, or as changes lumped under the catchalls of
&dquo;acculturation&dquo; and &dquo;modernization.&dquo; Both these terms are
useful and even relevant to some extent for this essay, but they
are not wholly satisfactory. We cannot deny that some of the
content of present-day Taiwan life reflects the influence of
Japanese and American/European thought and practices. But
selective borrowing from other societies can only be understood
in the total context of the receiving-culture’s experiences and
organization. And &dquo;modernization&dquo; is an even less useful term.
It is culture bound to a high degree, and if carelessly used, it can
lead us to mistake form for content. These points will be made
clearer as we get into discussion of the data.
Lastly, it is hoped that this paper succeeds in one further
purpose, which is to inject a feminist consciousness into the
analysis of the position of women in modern Taiwan. By
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&dquo;feminist&dquo; I mean a heightened awareness of problems shared
by women across cultural boundaries and class lines, at different
stages of economic development and under differing political
systems. The intensity of sexual polarization varies from one
society to the next, as does the content of the control over
women by men and the content of oppression. To note that the
intensity and content vary does not dissolve the reality of
oppression of women as a special class or caste, marked by
gender for peculiarly similar treatment within a wide range of
societal contexts. The sexual division of labor is the oldest and
most persistent such division in human society as a whole. It
becomes oppressive at that point in social development when
women’s share in the total social endeavor is denigrated and
given lesser rewards and when gender is taken as the decisive
indicator of talent, ability, and expectable personality traits.
The history of women in China seems to have been one of
increasing oppression from the T’ang dynasty on. Changes in
the past half-century have been changes in content, a modifica-
tion and partial amelioration of a heavier oppression, not the
ushering in of full equality. Both the government of the
People’s Republic of China and the Kuomintang government in
Taiwan officially claim that men and women are equal in their
societies: the statements of the PRC come much closer to the
truth In Taiwan, such claims have far less basis. It is still valid
to speak of the oppression of women as women across class
lines in present-day Taiwan, and I would even suggest that this
oppression has become stronger in the past decade or so despite
dramatic gains made by some women earlier in the century.
IDEOL OG Y, POLITICS, AND WOMEN
No occupation is denied to them and they dominate some
(barbering, for example) which are usually reserved for men. The
mothers of China are the strong supporters of Children’s Day and
the backers of legislation providing for child care and expanded
education ... the women make up the core of the congregations of
all the religions in Asia.
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Girls have led the way into the industrial future with their manual
dexterity and their quickness ... of those in electronics and the
plants of other industries requiring precision work, 90 per cent are
female.
Entertainment is big business for the Chinese young lady. Female
movie stars make much more than the men. All the top singers are
girls. Modeling is in its infancy, but growing fast [Free China
Review, 1971 ] .
The present-day social attitudes in Taiwan are a reflection of
an ongoing political and economic milieu. It is therefore
essential to examine the political-ideological posture of the
KMT vis-i-vis the woman question in the years before 1949
and during their tenure in Taiwan. Although some of the older
leadership had participated in the May Fourth Movement or had
been influenced by it during the 1920s, the KMT’s center and
right wings soon moved toward a cautious conservatism and
even a reactionary stance in their discussion of women’s place in
the family and society.
From 1927 on, radical women, including feminist women,
were under attack not only from conservative elements in
Chinese society generally but also directly from the Kuomin-
tang. In her autobiographical statement (Snow, 1967: 241-242),
Cai Chang recalls.
More than 1000 women leaders were killed in that year alone in all
of China-not all were Communists, some were bourgeois and there
were many students, but all were revolutionary leaders ... General
Ho Ch’ien [sic] in my home province Hunan was the cruellest of all.
He tied men to horses and split their limbs. And when girls were
arrested in Hunan, they were stripped naked, nailed on crosses and
their noses and breasts cut off before they were killed. This was
done officially by gendarmes under command of their officers. After
girl students were beheaded, their heads were put into men’s coffins,
and the gendarmes said: &dquo;You have your free love now!&dquo; If girls and
men happened to be killed at the same time their heads were
exchanged on their bodies. The girls’ bodies were always horribly
mutilated. In Hunan and Canton, Communists were not shot but
beheaded with swords-girls the same. During the execution, the
parents were often forced to stand witness and not permitted to cry.
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After the Canton Commune at least two hundred to three hundred
girls were killed. It is actually true that if a girl had bobbed hair she
was subject to execution as a Communist in Hunan and Canton.
In an interview in the early 1930s with Agnes Smedley, a
woman leader identified as Chang Siao-hung gives the following
description (Smedley, 1933: 85) of the take-over in Shanghai
by the Kuomintang and the tragic aftermath.
Every girl with bobbed hair who was caught was stripped naked,
raped by as many men as were present, then her body slit in two,
from below upwards. Often the girls were no more than fifteen or
sixteen, and officers, giving interviews to eager British journalists
from Hong Kong, said: &dquo;The bobbed haired girls are the worst; they
are very arrogant and talk back defiantly. We have had to kill
hundreds of them.&dquo;
Similar stories are indicated by Hsieh Ping-ying (1940) in the
truncated version of her autobiography Girl Rebel as she
describes the terrified flight and hiding of the women soldiers
who had assisted in the Northern Expeditions and identified the
Kuomintang’s cause as their own. In the 1925-1927 period it is
estimated that a million and a half women had been organized
in ten provinces under He Xiang-ning, chief of the Kuomintang
Women’s Department, and a member of the Hankow govern-
ment and left wing of the KMT. (One might note that in 1925,
the right wing of the KMT attempted to have her assassinated at
the same time they killed her husband, Liao Zhong-kai, a close
associate of Sun Yat-sen.) Working from their Hankow base, the
left wing of the KMT trained women organizers, set up women’s
unions, provided marriage and divorce bureaus, and educated
local women in the meaning of the revolution. Several hundred
women were trained to work as propagandists with the army.
But after Chiang’s coup, these women were in direct danger.
Only a handful of the top leaders were able to escape the purges
that followed, and many women met their death on the
evidence of bobbed hair, unbound feet, or their local reputation
for having opposed familial authority in a marriage arrangement
or demanded a divorce (Snow, 1967: 136-137).
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In early 1934, Chiang Kai-shek launched the New Life
Movement from his Nanchang headquarters, where he served as
commander-in-chief of the military operations for the suppres-
sion of communism. With the endorsement of the national
government, the movement spread and became a part of the
official ideology. As outlined by Chiang, the aim of the
movement was a &dquo;social regeneration of China&dquo; through a
revival of the moral principles of li, yi, lien, and chi (propriety,
justice, honesty, and self-respect), a neo-Confucian revival
which would return to the traditional moral teachings and apply
them to ordinary matters (Chiang, 1935). It was at this time
that Chiang looked to Germany, rather than the Soviet Union,
as a model. He admired the strength he saw there, which he
attributed to a moral code similar to that urged by Confucian
thought (Chiang, 1935: 41). The new order of fascism, with its
emphasis on military power and total control, struck a chord of
response within the KMT. So too did its emphasis on the
patriarchal family and male supremacy. The KMT thus encour-
aged a backlash action against the anti-Confucianism and
feminism that had crystallized in the May Fourth Movement
and had held sway in the 1920s.
Lloyd Eastman, in his article on the Blue Shirts (1972) has
clearly documented the fact that the inspiration for that
organization and its ideology (later to be transmuted into the
New Life Movement) stemmed directly from European fascist
movements. Liberalism in any form was equated with license
and personal indulgence. What was needed in China, or so the
right wing of the KMT and Chiang himself felt, was discipline,
obedience to the leader, a new asceticism, and a return to the
root values of Chinese culture. Nationalism, exaltation of the
state, glorification of the leader, subordination to the collective
will, and the glorification of violence and terror all had their
place in this school of thought. A militarized education for the
young was a necessary step in spreading this orientation, and at
the middle school there was formal military training for boys
and nurse’s training for girls. Puritanism also held sway,
including sanctioned physical attacks on people attending the
[9]
cinema or dance halls or engaging in other forms of &dquo;decadent
Westernization &dquo; Even with the disbanding of the Blue Shirts in
1938, their spirit lived on in the Youth Corps (still functioning
today in Taiwan in modified form).
The final death knell to an independent women’s movement
in the KMT-run area of the mainland came in May 1938, with a
conference called at Kuling by Madame Chiang Kai-shek. Its
ostensible purpose was to mobilize women for the war effort,
and the fifty invited delegates included women leaders from all
over the country. Some were provincial delegates, others were
writers, organization heads, student leaders, and outstanding
professional women. Soong Ching-ling was noticeably absent.
As envisioned by the Madame, women were to play a supportive
but vital role in the coming struggle with Japan. As she outlined
it at the meeting, their activities would include such tasks as
caring for war orphans, writing letters for the troops, providing
medical care, and staffing relief agencies. What other responsi-
bilities a women’s movement might have were left unsaid. The
meetings elected a standing committee, with the Madame as
chairman and eminent persons such as Madame H. H. Kung and
Madame Feng Yu-xiang as members. It was also &dquo;decided&dquo; at
this meeting that the Chinese Women’s Advisory Committee of
the New Life Movement (of which Madame Chiang was also
apparently the president) would from henceforth be the agency
through which all women’s activities were to function (see Wei,
1943 213-219; Hahn, 1941 1 280-281 )
During the late 1930s, Madame Chiang expounded on the
position of women in a number of speeches and essays. In an
article written in 1936 on the New Life Movement she
expressed the idea that the education and health of a nation’s
women were a measure of &dquo;civilization&dquo; and that educated, able
women should engage in public service &dquo;consistent with those
duties that embrace the care of their homes.&dquo; She made clear
that her definition of public service involved teaching literacy
and home management to less fortunate women and that the
scope of change was to be limited
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The women must realize that mostly their thoughts and actions are
not right, and they must emancipate themselves from ignorance and
inertia. Their family life should be orderly, their houses clean, and
they should resolutely work against gambling, smoking, drinking,
extravagance and other bad habits of life [Soong, 1938. 315-321 ]
In an undated article from the same period, Madame Chiang
enthusiastically described the curriculum for girl students in a
special school for the children of revolutionary martyrs.
Pointing out that &dquo;boys and girls need separate training with a
view to the development of their respective talents,&dquo; she
describes the girls’ programs from fifth grade on:
They are instructed in sewing, hosiery, embroidery, weaving, making
artificial flowers, toys and rattan work. In addition to meeting their
own needs, a considerable part of the hand work can be sold, as was
the case at Christmas 1933 [Soong, 1938 .
In fairness, one should note that the boys’ studies embraced
agriculture, carpentry, and building, but by Madame Chiang’s
own account it was only boys from these schools who were sent
on to college or technical training (Soong, 1938: 323-332). Her
statements about women’s education changed only slightly in
regard to the audience. In a 1937 message to the National
Christian Council (Soong, 1938: 341-349) the Madame praised
Christian mission schools for raising the status of women and
sending forth educated women to improve the living conditions
and status of their women compatriots. Still, she reserved
particular praise here for the Women’s Prayer League of Canton,
an organization of 1,000 members which prayed daily for China
and its leaders, pointing to it as &dquo;one of the most practical
forms of patriotism.&dquo; And what are we to make of her assertion
in this speech that &dquo;mission schools in China had to offer girls
free tuition and spending money to induce them to accept a
modern education. It is to the lasting credit of the missionaries
that they used every means to get girls to study&dquo; (Soong, 1938:
345). Given the social background of the times, surely it was
the girl’s father who had to be induced by whatever means to
give permission.
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It was into hands of this kind that leadership of the women’s
movements fell in the late 1930s. Wartime expediency, the
united front against Japan, and the strict political controls
within the KMT-ruled areas did not allow for the strong
expression of alternate viewpoints and positions on the women
question. In an interview given to Reuters in Nanking in
September 1937, Madame Chiang had already outlined her
position on the activities of women in the wartime struggle
(Soong, 1938: 117). It would be a rear-lines operation in which
women would assist the Red Cross, provide comfort for the
troops, raise funds, and arrange patriotic meetings. In addition,
The women have to assist in upholding the morale of the nation in
its gravest trial; in obeying implicitly the orders of the Government,
and having these orders carried out by all citizens; in suppressing
rumors, and, by economies, conserving the nation’s foodstuffs and
apparel.
Despite her open doubts that the &dquo;physical strength and
endurance of women could equal that of men,&dquo; she did concede
that it might be necessary for women to do farm work and even
take over &dquo;many of the ordinary occupations of men&dquo; during
the war. But these latter remarks were addressed to a foreign
audience, and not to the people of China or the women’s
groups-at least, the suggestion that women join the productive
labor force is not to be found in the essays and speeches
prepared for internal consumption. There is also some doubt
that women were widely organized even for these rear-line
activities in the KMT areas.
Representative of the thought of the war-years period is a
book on marriage and the family commissioned in 1943 by the
Funu Yundong Weiyuanhui in Chungking (Li, 1970). Little is
said about careers continuing after marriage or women’s
participation in the work force. Rather, women are encouraged
to recognize that care of the household and children is their
primary duty, and many of the chapters deal with the details of
housework management. Readers are assured that no nursery
school or child-care center can substitute for a mother’s love
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and guidance. Conjugal love receives a great deal of emphasis,
though Li tells her audience they should not begin talking about
love until they are in college and should not consider marriage
until after college graduation. Obviously, she is writing for a
select and privileged audience, and it is significant that she
stresses the domestic role even for this educated group. For
those who might complain that she is defending a very
traditional view of women’s roles, she explains that while in the
past women could only look forward to marriage, now they can
go to school before marriage, and while in the past they could
only do housework, now they can take an interest in national
affairs, or continue to further their knowledge and intellectual
development.
The more equalitarian position taken in the communist base
areas during this period was anathema to the Kuomintang. As
Han Suyin relates (1968: 147), even the staunch right wing of
the Kuomintang found much to admire in reports coming out
of the border areas, but
one accusation could be flung at them safely and that was, of course,
sex. Their greatest crime was &dquo;free love,&dquo; and therefore &dquo;dangerous
thoughts&dquo;! They preached &dquo;equality of women&dquo;! Appalling crimes
which threatened the salvation of China! Though even the most
rabid anti-Red newspapers could not accuse the communists of
corruption, of letting their troops die of starvation (as happened on
the Chiang side), of trafficking with the enemy, they could be
accused of practising orgies! They actually had women in the Red
armies, girls dressed as boys and carrying guns! They encouraged
slave girls and concubines to revolt against their masters! Their
widows remarried! They did not insist on &dquo;chastity&dquo;! They incited
the peasant women to stand up and denounce their husbands’
misdeeds!
The accusations of sexual immorality and &dquo;unnatural behavior&dquo;
have continued to be part of the KMT line in its propaganda
war against the People’s Republic. A book on the history of
women in China (Yang, 1964) devotes the final chapter to a se-
ries of sick fantasies about how women are abused and sexually
exploited under socialism. Participation of women in the labor
[13]
force is referred to as &dquo;slavery,&dquo; and the principle of equal pay
for equal work is interpreted to mean that women must do the
same heavy labor or more than men. The presence of women in
the People’s Liberation Army is taken as proof that they serve
as military prostitutes. And the Taiwan audience is told that not
only has family life been destroyed in China but that women
are forced into marriage or liaisons with local or Russian &dquo;big
nose&dquo; cadres, that in some cases women are forced to live with
three or more men simultaneously, that they have many
miscarriages because of being forced to work, and so on and so
forth (Yang, 1964 337-346). Clearly the message is to count
one’s blessings and beware of equalitarian promises.
Kate Millett’s discussion (1970. 157-168) of the position of
women in Nazi Germany is pertinent here. The German fascist
state bears certain similarities to the Kuomintang’s system of
organization and rule, both in the particulars of attitudes
toward women and in the wider sense. Both were strongly
militaristic and strongly anti-communist regimes, infused with a
neopuritanism and distrust of human impulses unhampered by
the strictest control. The uniforms, the cropped hair, the
&dquo;wholesome&dquo; military discipline that continues to infuse the
school system and the Youth Corps in Taiwan are in much the
same spirit as the Hitler Jugend. Unquestioning allegiance to the
state, to the leader, and to nationalistic goals (&dquo;fight back to the
mainland&dquo;) are additional points of similarity developed on the
mainland and transported to Taiwan. In this ideological
environment, the thinking about women shows a number of
parallels.
The ideal role for women, in both Nazi Germany and
KMT-ruled areas of China from 1927 on, is motherhood, which
is glorified and praised publicly Mother’s Day in Taiwan is an
official holiday, singling out women whose children have
achieved success because of maternal care and self-sacrifice.
Indeed, child-rearing is held out as the most important role that
a woman can play Few in government circles would object to
the idea that the aim of feminine education is invariably to be
the future mother, and as in Germany, female admissions to
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senior middle school are limited to one-third of the total with
strong emphasis on training for future wifehood and mother-
hood.
The exclusion of women from upper levels of the work force
and the firing of married women typify both regimes, as does
praise for women who remain in the more &dquo;feminine&dquo; lines of
endeavor such as nursing, social work, and elementary-school
teaching. Since one-sixth of the male work force is in the army
at any one time in Taiwan, there must be some female
participation in the upper levels of the work force and heavy
participation of young unmarried women in the factories and
on the farms.
As many writers have pointed out, authoritarian governments
tend to favor patriarchy or some form of machismo and
supermasculinity. They deny the existence of female sexuality
by inhibiting and repressing it, and they relegate women to
menial labor and child care tasks, turning women into a special
category. The militaristic, repressive quality of state rule in
Taiwan makes the home the hoped-for refuge and haven for
men from the pressures of society where the man is served by
others and where he takes full command. For this to occur,
women must be less independent economically, less educated,
and more docile and aware of their many limitations. They are
simultaneously worshiped as mothers and perceived as inferior
persons. The politics of the state, which conducts its internal
affairs as if it were still actively at war, makes it impossible for
women to organize and raise feminist demands for change in
their status and in their roles, just as it makes it impossible for
any dissident group to be heard: Those who question social
events are not merely critics, they are potential traitors. A
recent listing of 214 political prisoners being held in Taiwan
cites the crimes of six as discontentment with the status quo, a
transgression which carries anywhere from four to twelve years
in jail. Another thirteen had &dquo;criticized the KMT&dquo; or expressed
&dquo;discontent,&dquo; actions which make one liable to four to fourteen
years in jail (Ronin, 1972).
The official line on women in Taiwan is that their status is
steadily improving. Several women’s organizations are paternal-
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istically approved and encouraged by the government, which
accepts their existence as a given.
The Chinese Women’s Anti-Aggression League, founded by
Madame Chiang, claims an active membership of 248,213 and
the ability to mobilize one million women on short notice.
Many, if not all, of these are drawn from military and
government circles. The league’s professed goal is &dquo;to mobilize
women for social service and auxiliary duties in the anti-
Communist struggle,&dquo; though it appears to draw mainly on
upper-strata women as activists. Projects and programs include
voluntary sewing of clothing for military personnel, collection
and donation of cash, clothes, and foodstuffs for needy military
dependents, the operation of 35 milk-bars for needy children,
the maintenance of schools and orphanages for war orphans and
the children of civil servants and military personnel, assistance
to retired servicemen, collections of clothing for Vietnamese
refugees, aid for KMT soldiers returned from Burma and
Vietnam (!), and relief services to needy women and overseas
Chinese girl students in Taiwan. These same wartime activities
have been assigned women since 1938. The members also make
radio broadcasts to the mainland and sponsor free movies for
military personnel and their dependents. Some 8,000 women
presumably drawn from the lower strata of society are involved
in classes, under the league’s auspices, to learn marketable skills
such as knitting, sewing, first aid, embroidery, cooking, typing,
accounting, and English, as well as sculpture and flower
arranging. Reportedly, over 600,000 women receive its publica-
tion, Chinese Women’s Monthly (China Yearbook, 1969-1970:
338-339).
The Kuomintang Women’s Department, for party members
and thus an elite group, holds as its goal the safeguarding of
women’s rights and interests and helping women to become
good housewives and citizens. It provides some legal services
and maternity clinics, home-nurse visits, a monthly magazine
called Women’s Companion with a circulation of 8,000, it
encourages women to engage in &dquo;social and wartime services,&dquo;
presumably on a voluntary basis, conducts surveys on the
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condition of women, and operates classes in sewing and typing
on Kinmen: In 1968-1969 it instructed 11,000 women in
&dquo;environmental sanitation,&dquo; a recurrent obsession in KMT
circles, particularly in connection with women’s work (China
Yearbook 1969-1970: 339-340).
No membership figures are available for the Women’s
Association for the Study of Asian Problems, an umbrella
organization designed to encourage an understanding of Chinese
culture. It sponsors lectures and various activities for members
of the foreign community. It too appears to be an elite group,
similar to the Taipei International Women’s Club, with its 500
members (many of whom are from the diplomatic and
American military community) who engage in voluntary welfare
activities and presentation of cultural events. Madame Chiang is
again president of this organization (China Yearbook,
1969-1970: 340-341).
With more mass appeal than other women’s groups on the list
of approved organizations is the Taiwan Provincial Women’s
Association, numbering 96,000 members. It publishes a month-
ly, Taiwan Women (Taiwan fund). Its purpose is to &dquo;protect
women’s rights and promote women’s social status, welfare,
education, and marital harmony.&dquo; In 1968-1969, it secured
employment for some 400 women, provided legal counsel for
323 cases of family disputes, trained almost 500 women in
sewing, handicrafts, and flower arranging, held symposia, and
selected 345 &dquo;model families.&dquo; It also provided some financial
aid to almost 1,000 needy women (China Yearbook,
1969-1970- 350-351).
The magazine of the Provincial Women’s Association by-
passes feminist goals. For example, the March issue of 1968,
presented for International Women’s Day a lead article heavily
reminiscent of the New Life Movement. Women were urged to
turn their attention to (1) basic hygiene and sanitation (that is,
collecting and disposing of garbage), (2) being thrifty, simple,
and sanitary in preparing food, and, for example, not allowing
bodily wastes to come into contact with food; (3) showing good
manners in public places such as buses, theaters, and parks by
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not talking loudly or laughing or throwing orange peels around,
by keeping off the grass, and by giving one’s seat to elderly
people; (4) keeping public outhouses and restrooms clean, and
showing concern for the sanitary conditions and maintenance
around public wells and gravesites. The fifth point dealt with
upkeep and repair of homes and community buildings, includ-
ing sweeping one’s own yard and cleaning open sewers. Lastly,
the readers were urged to bring these principles of social
education to the attention of their local government organiza-
tions, police, and party officials and see that they were put into
practice All this, it was promised, would make for a modern-
ized citizenry and a country that was not only prosperous and
strong, but also happy.
It is hard to judge how such exhortations go over with the
readership. Since the magazine is sufficiently difficult in style to
be of little appeal to those with less than a junior middle-school
education, it seems unlikely that its average reader requires
lecturing in the basics of hygiene and public behavior. The
magazine’s attraction may stem from its other articles, which
are similar to those in commercial women’s magazines. These
include articles on infant care and child-rearing, dress patterns
and recipes, beauty and grooming tips, home medical advice,
and articles on the secrets of marital happiness and successful
family life There are also short pieces submitted by the
readership.
The readers’ contributions, in the form of letters or short
articles, are often very poignant in their distress. A short item in
the May 1968 issue entitled &dquo;If I Were a Male&dquo; lists the various
advantages that men have in current society, such as a chance to
use their knowledge and abilities, the right to maintain
friendships and spend their free time with friends, the right to
travel around the country, the right to laugh openly, to walk
with confident step, to ignore fashion and cosmetics, and (as an
afterthought) to be taken seriously by their teachers in school.
Yet the conclusion to the article is not a demand or even a
request that women share in these privileges, but rather
resignation to the idea that nowhere in the world do women
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have such privileges and by the author that if there is indeed a
next life she be reborn as a boy.
This article exemplifies the limits that are put on discontent
and questioning of sex-assigned roles in official publications. To
take the discussion one step further and protest as a feminist
does not seem to be possible in present-day Taiwan society. It is
permissible to be envious of men, to resent being a woman.
Indeed, it is expected that many women will be, hence the large
number of articles reassuring women of the central role they
play in the modern family, their crucial importance to
household members, and the irreplaceable value of the tasks
they perform in the mother and housewife roles. (Typical titles
of articles: &dquo;A Woman’s Best Friend Is Her Husband&dquo;-Septem-
ber 1968; &dquo;Developing Your Child’s Sense of Responsi-
bility&dquo;-November 1968; &dquo;Don’t Let Your Children Become
Spoiled&dquo;-December 1968; &dquo;Children Who Have Lost Maternal
Love&dquo;-May 1968; &dquo;My Mother’s White Hair&dquo;-May 1968.)
Successful socialization of women to their adult role involves
their putting aside their resentments of its confinement to the
home or at least a patient resignation to the indisputable fact
that one has been born female. Anatomy is destiny.
THE LIFE-STYLE OFMIDDLE CLASS WOMEN
Between 1969 and 1971, I was engaged in a study of 240
middle-class households in Taiwan City. (Some of this material
appears elsewhere; see Diamond, 1973a, 1973b.) The sample
was designed to match two life-styles, not to reflect the actual
distribution in the population. Of the married women in the
final sample, 108 were full-time housewives, 112 were em-
ployed full time, and 20 were employed on a part-time basis,
some by their husbands and others on salary. All but one had at
least one child-and the childless one was pregnant. Except
when I generalize about the entire sample, those working
part-time will not be included in the discussion.
Because a disproportionate number of middle-class jobs are
held by mainlander men, only 121 of these families are headed
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by Taiwanese husbands. The sample was selected on the basis of
education and occupation, not ethnicity. One hundred forty-
three of the women themselves were ethnic Taiwanese. Thirty-
four of the husbands worked for the military and/or police at
the officer level. these were, of course, predominantly main-
landers. Ninety-seven can be classified as professionals (engi-
neers, teachers and professors, scientists, court officials and
judges, and so on), 65 as white-collar workers (including
functionaries in the civil-service bureaucracy as well as ac-
countants and others in private enterprise); 27 were in
managerial positions, and 10 fell into a class of skilled
worker/other. In terms of education, 105 of the men were
college graduates, 9 had postgraduate degrees, 58 had gone to
upper-level technical schools and junior colleges, 54 were senior
middle-school graduates and 12 had only a junior middle-school
education.
Let us now turn our attention more specifically to the
women. Most had work experience, if only before marriage, in
relatively good positions: 100 were in professions (mainly
teachers), 102 were white-collar workers, and only 23 had never
been employed. Of those still working, 45.5% were profes-
sionals and 49% were white-collar workers, with the rest
scattered through police work and other jobs. Among the
housewives, a high percentage had also held parallel professional
and white-collar jobs (37% of the housewives, for each of those
categories), though some 20% had never worked at all. The
move into full-time domesticity, therefore, had not been a flight
from undesirable jobs. If one cancels out those who had never
worked, the job distribution prior to marriage is similar for
housewives and employed wives.
Educationally, the women as a group fall behind their
spouses, which is expectable, since women even today make up
only one-third of the enrollment in senior middle schools and
colleges. In the entire sample, only 44 had attended college, 16
had gone to junior colleges and technical schools, 2 had done
postgraduate work, 124 had gone through senior high school.
Fifty-three had a junior middle-school education or less, which
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in the younger age-sets now disqualifies most of them from jobs
in accord with middle-class status. Their experience before
marriage had been in working-class jobs or none at all, and for
them in particular the role of housewife, with no outside work,
represents a step up. As one would expect, proportionately
fewer housewives had college or technical schooling, and a
larger percentage had less than senior middle school. It is
perhaps the educational gap between spouses that makes more
of the housewives regard the husband and his family as coming
from a higher. social position than their own household
members. The reality of this is hard to check out, since many of
the women, particularly those married to mainlander males,
were unclear about the educational level or occupations of their
husband’s fathers or other kin. The social backgrounds of the
two groups of women themselves are very close, except in the
housewives’ sample a slightly higher percentage of fathers were
in the military or in business, while the employed wives were
more likely to report fathers in white-collar jobs. But otherwise
the percentages are equal for those with fathers in the
professions, or, at the other end of the scale, those who
originally came from working-class or peasant backgrounds. (In
neither group were the women’s mothers actively employed
outside-the percentages are small, and the difference not
significant except that more employed wives identified their
mothers as active in farming compared with the housewives,
while more of the housewives came from business families
where their mothers worked in the family shop: 25% of their
mothers did so, in contrast to 15% of the employed wives’
mothers.) And, if one looks at the occupational spread of the
two groups of husbands, it quickly becomes apparent that it is
the employed wives who may have married into a higher social
status: 46% of them are married to professional men while only
31.5% of the housewives are.
In terms of actual household organization, the two groups
present some differences. Most live in nuclear families, but in
the case of more complex organization, it is the housewives who
are more &dquo;modern&dquo; and the employed women who are more
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traditional. In other words, the women with outside jobs are the
more likely to have their in-laws or own parent co-resident (see
Diamond, 1973b). They expect and receive considerably more
help from extended family members than do the housewives. In
some cases, a mother-in-law or mother came to live with them
during their children’s infancy in order to make it possible for
them to continue working. In other cases, the mother-in-law is
there permanently and is willing to help with child care and the
domestic routine to an extent that an unemployed housewife is
seldom helped by a live-in mother-in-law. This raises a host of
questions about the nature of that particular relationship, which
we will return to presently.
Another important element in the employed wife’s house-
hold is the presence of a servant, made possible by the higher
income of a double-wage-eaming family. In the past, 45% of the
working couples could afford full-time servants, while only 20%
of the housewives had them in single-income households. At the
time of the interviewing, 12% of the working couples still had
servants, compared with 6.5% of the housewives. What this
means in effect is that between servants and helpful relatives
84% of the employed women had help at one time or another
with domestic chores and child care, only 41% of housewives
had similar help, though the number would be larger if they had
earned a salary to pay for servants
In cases where mothers-in-law and servants could not be
brought into the household, the employed wives have been
better able to turn to their husbands for assistance. On the
other hand, markedly fewer of their husbands allowed them-
selves to become involved in the mechanics of child care (5%,
compared with 19% of housewives’ husbands), suggesting
strongly that even though a certain equalitarianism operates
between working husbands and wives, the line is drawn at
parenting. This is defined as a woman’s task, which explains
why roughly 20% of the employed wives interrupted their
careers during the early child-rearing years and why salaries for
servants or the cost of nursery schools is paid out of the wife’s
earnings.
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Among those who were housewives, marriage and termina-
tion of work came simultaneously for 20%, in some cases
because they were employed in situations where resignation was
mandatory. Another 32% worked until their first pregnancy and
then dropped out of the labor force. Almost 17% stopped
because there was no perceived economic need for them to
work. Six percent stopped specifically because their husbands
disapproved. Oddly enough, 14% of the employed women also
said that their husbands disapproved completely, and another
14% said their husbands had reservations, but they had not, for
the most part, allowed this to interrupt their careers.
For housewives, the domestic role has been allowed to take
full priority, yet there is ambivalence about it. A third of them
indicated that they would prefer to be working but that they
had no choice in the matter, and 40% expressed hope that they
could find jobs after the childen had all finished school. But
half of them were convinced that house and children come
before all else in a woman’s life-the others expressed concern
about using their knowledge, about self-expression, and about
finding enjoyment in life. Ambivalence and discomfort with
their role are also found among the employed wives. Only 10%
expressly felt they would rather stay home, but 44% did not
think it right for a woman to work when she had young
children (even if they had done so). Another 26% thought that
a woman’s first duty was to look after the household, even if
they were not doing so. But these women continue to work.
despite the contradictory feelings and guilt, 80% had unbroken
careers except for involuntary unemployment due to the war or
health problems. And only 12% mentioned money as a primary
reason for working-they were far more concerned about the
enjoyment they found in their work, the chance to use their
knowledge and the psychological gratifications. Ten percent had
reached a happy compromise by deciding that they were
working in order to give the children added advantages in life
and thus fulfilling their maternal role.
The main dissatisfaction with the role of housewife in
modern Taiwan, and particularly in the growing new middle
[23]
class, is that it usually involves considerable social isolation, far
beyond that depicted for American suburbia or city. The
middle class we are discussing is spatially mobile as well as
upwardly mobile. They flow into the cities from the rural
hinterland, leaving kinfolk behind or scattered to yet other
locations. The husband’s entry to the city may be smoothed by
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school and army connections through which he locates a job
and gains access to a network of friends. The woman, unless she
is working and able to establish friendship networks on the job,
must rely on whatever kin and former schoolmates she can
locate in the city-and sometimes there are none. Moreover, as
we have seen, she is less and less likely to have resident kin or
servants, and thus during the children’s early years is hampered
in traveling to see friends or kin who live at any distance. (I
might add parenthetically that the private home telephone is
still a tremendous luxury in Taiwan and not a common item
even among the middle class. One has a color TV, refrigerator,
hi-fi set, motorcycle, and even a secondhand car long before one
has a telephone.)
In a smaller city, such as Tainan, the question of distance
from kin is not as severe as it is in Taipei. Only 25% of the total
sample had no relatives in the general Tainan area, and half the
sample did manage to see close relatives such as parents and
siblings at least once a week (this, of course, includes the
50-odd households living patrilocally and the 14 which incorpo-
rated the wife’s mother). But ties to kin beyond the immediate
household are weak, particularly to those living in other parts of
Taiwan who are seen once or twice a year at best-in some cases
never (or so 47 of the households reported).
Reliance on the immediate neighborhood also breaks down
among this middle-class group. Partially this is due to the
physical arrangement of middle-class living high walls around
houses or apartment entryways, topped with barbed wire and
jagged glass, so that each unit is totally blocked off from the
adjacent ones. Apartment complexes and entire neighborhoods
are built without provision for play space and gathering space.
Spatial isolation is the norm, unlike the peasant villages where
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houses are open and there is social space shared by people from
different households. Another factor operating against neigh-
borliness is the heterogeneous quality of the street, which may
have squatter shacks on one end, working-class housing at the
other and expensive middle-class townhouses scattered in
between-it is difficult to cross class lines to make friends. Yet
even where there is homogeneity, neighbors may maintain social
distance.
One of our informants, for example, lived on a street reserved
for persons employed at high levels in one of the local
government organizations. Although the husbands were all
acquainted with each other through work ties, many of the
wives remained strangers. Our informant had lived on the street
for fourteen years but had made no close friends among her
husband’s colleagues’ wives. Nothing was organized to bring
them closer together and no attempts were made to integrate
newcomers. The best possibility for initiating a relationship was
that a new arrival might be a former schoolmate or work
associate, or carry a letter of introduction from someone close
to an established resident. Otherwise, it would take several years
before the women would be on chatting terms, a degree of
relationship arrived at after several New Year’s calls or brief
conversations at the yearly banquet held by the organization for
its staff.
Some of the women compensate for the absence of neighbors
by involving themselves in religious activity. For the most part,
the women in this social class are not likely to be active in local
temple organizations-only 15 women in the entire sample paid
monthly visits to local Buddhist and Taoist temples, and only 6
saw themselves as frequent temple-goers. Moreover, that does
not imply participation in a group. Almost 37% of our sample,
however, had found their way to the Catholic or Protestant
church, which is a high figure considering that Christians are at
most 5% of the total population of Taiwan. In some instances,
it was a family matter with the husband also belonging to the
church, but in 27 households only the wife was Christian and
the husband did not participate at all. Usually, attendance was
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on a weekly basis. For a few, religion had swelled to great
importance in their lives-for some 10% in the entire sample,
church involvement meant attendance several times a week or
even daily. Several of them had joined storefront fundamen-
talist sects that had daily prayer meetings, though this was three
times more likely to occur among full-time housewives than
among either employed wives or those working part-time.
Friendships in this group were usually church connected.
For those who reject the religious community (and 53 of our
women were professed atheists), what are the alternatives for
finding friends and maintaining friendships? For a small
number, the answer is that there are no alternatives: 11 % of the
housewives and 8% of the working wives stated that they had
no one they could consider a friend in the Tainan area. The
neighborhood, as already mentioned, provided few friendships.
Of the housewives, who spent their entire day at home, only
3.7% could claim good friends within the neighborhood. This
figure is not much better than the employed wives (2 7%) who
were away from the neighborhood at least eight hours a day.
Loneliness is somewhat relieved by visits back and forth with
neighboring women even if one cannot regard them as good
friends, and 22.2% of the housewives had reached that level of
relationship within the neighborhood (9.8% of the working
wives had managed similarly). The remainder were limited to
brief greetings or an occasional walk together to the market and
back, and a few did not even have that, ignoring their neighbors
completely.
Another workable alternative is to locate former classmates
and workmates in the city and retain those friendships and
build on them. Well over half of the wives have kin ties in the
Tainan area, suggesting that many spent their earlier years there
as well. As a result, some 37% had been able to retain ties with
former classmates, this in some cases overlapping with col-
leagues at work. In addition, about 30% initiated new friend-
ships at work as their main source of friends.
In the Western world, many women’s friendships after
marriage are originated through their husbands. That is, they are
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able to draw on the wives of their husbands’ friends and
associates. In the Taiwan middle class, this seemed to be
possible for only 5% of the sample. For 70% of all the women,
husbands’ friends’ wives were virtually strangers, not even
visited occasionally. In a large number of cases, they had not
even met their husbands’ friends, let alone the latters’ wives.
This is because male recreation activities tend to take place
outside the home: men meet their friends at restaurants,
coffeehouses, and less respectable establishments. If friends
come to call, they usually are not accompanied by their wives,
and the woman of the house is not expected to entertain them
beyond serving something to eat or drink. The more sophisti-
cated mainland-refugee families are more likely to visit as
couples and entertain as couples, or so we deduce from the fact
that only 4% of the mainland wives claimed never to have met
any of their husbands’ male friends, while 22.5% of the
Taiwanese wives made that statement.
Perhaps ethnicity plays a part here. Tainan is a very
Taiwanese city, with relatively few good restaurants offering
good mainland Chinese food (the two best restaurants in town
are, in fact, Japanese!). This in itself may explain the greater
frequency with which mainlanders spoke of inviting friends to
the house for dinner. Ethnic loyalties certainly play a crucial
role in selection of friends: 41 households defined all their
friends as tongxiang, 98 said most friends came from the same
region or province, and 34 said half. The rest were flexible,
sometimes by default, as in the case of a woman from Yunnan.
Be that as it may, most of the women claimed they had few
friends, and these were mainly women known before marriage.
Sociability in Taiwan is somewhat difficult for both sexes,
however. Grichting’s (1971) survey work gives women only a
slight edge over men in terms of depth or frequency of social
contacts with neighbors, and as one might expect, the greater
the size and complexity of the community, the less interaction
there is. Interaction with neighbors decreases with rises in level
of education. He also finds a peculiar reticence in discussing
various issues both with those defined as good friends and with
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one’s spouse, a hesitancy which oddly enough increases along
with education (Grichting, 1971, 279, 289, 290, 232).
This element of caution warrants some further discussion and
elaboration. E.-K. Yeh, the psychiatrist, comments in a recent
article on &dquo;the prevailing defensive and distrustful behavior
among Taiwanese&dquo; (which includes mainlanders living in Tai-
wan). He attributes this phenomenon to the strict political
control and the general political atmosphere which inclines
people to caution in personal interaction to avoid being
&dquo;cheated&dquo; or betrayed. As he puts it (Yeh, 1972: 337-338):
Stated in the extreme, one may need to be more or less paranoid
about others and one’s surroundings in present day Taiwan: this was
illustrated in the results of a questionnaire study of a large group of
students in a major urban university in Taiwan. More than half of
the students, 54.8%, responded positively to the question &dquo;Do you
feel that the outside world is full of traps so that you must be very
cautious to be free from plots that someone may have against you?&dquo;
21 percent agreed with the statement &dquo;Someone was deliberately
making trouble for you so you hate them very much&dquo;; and nearly
one-fifth of the students felt that people were often criticizing them.
Unless patterns of paranoid behavior are sharply deviant, they are
not regarded as unusual, and may even be considered common, in
present-day Chinese society.
Some of the &dquo;paranoid reaction,&dquo; Yeh goes on to say, is
explicable in terms of cultural factors (insecurity outside of the
family network, the emphasis on keeping harmonious relations,
fear of shaming, and concern with face), but he also relates it to
the strict security controls of the present regime.
And indeed one does need to look to political explanations as
well as cultural ones to understand why, in Grichting’s survey,
only 44% of college-educated people would be willing to discuss
local elections with a &dquo;good friend,&dquo; and worse still, only 55%
felt they could discuss it with their spouses (Grichting, 1971)!
The caution extends from politics to important matters
concerning the individual: in that same group, 40% would not
tell their best friends that they were having trouble on the job,
and 30% would not tell their spouses. In fact, the college
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educated were more likely than any others not to tell anyone
about the things affecting them. Human relationships are edged
with caution, and the caution infects even the marital relation-
ship and the immediate family unit. It perpetuates a distance
between spouses which reaches its highest levels in that
educated (that is, middle-class) segment where marriages are
usually assumed to have been contracted on the basis of choice,
affection, and mutual interest.
Apparently one brings home to the family the lessons learned
in the outside world. Those who have reached the highest levels
in the educational system are also those most aware of the
pressures and dangers of the outside world. From the first entry
into school the message is brought home that one person’s
success is another’s failure, that one is always being ranked and
measured and perhaps rejected. Those who survive the strains
and have some talent emerge into the search for a good job, a
quest which requires the good will and support of others as
much as the items on one’s vita These are problems not faced
by farmers, factory workers, small merchants, and the like.
They are middle-class problems which continue to influence
one’s relations to others.
Moreover, they occur in a setting which is truly dangerous for
the naive and unwary, or for those who have made enemies for
themselves. The government encourages an atmosphere of
distrust and betrayal in its sporadic attempts to uncover
political deviants. In the early 1960s and again in 1970, for
example, the government launched campaigns urging people to
report any evidences of procommunist or Taiwan-independence
thinking and activity among their kin, friends, colleagues, or
acquaintances. Amnesty was promised to those who made a
clean breast of things and brought in other names against whom
charges could be substantiated. Financial reward was also
promised, both in lump sum and as a percentage of the property
of those successfully prosecuted. Some people must have
responded, some threatened to and others simply took it as a
further lesson that silence and evasiveness are the best policy. If
the government really expects people to turn in their family
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members and friends, then who can be trusted? In addition,
these campaigns threatened punishment for those who did not
report any substantial suspicions about close family members or
friends. For example, if your best friend is arrested, you will at
least be interrogated by the military police about why you did
not report your friend five years ago. The lesson to be drawn
from that is that it’s best not to know too much of other
people’s social views.
Let us return to our middle-class sample and look at the
husband-wife relationship itself. Though we have suggested
earlier that some of these marriages come close to equalitarian
working partnerships with a shared social life, the majority do
not fall under that description. One obvious reason is that 44%
began as arranged marriages with little or no meeting of the
couple (25% had never met until the wedding day; the rest were
allowed a few interview meetings and asked for their opinion).
Despite all the talk about love’s being the basis for marriage in a
modern society, dating is officially frowned on for high-school
students, and even college girls would think twice about
accepting an invitation to a movie, a coffeehouse, or a dance
party. The various popular books on marriage and family still
suggest that it is best to let parents make the initial choice and
arrangements, and that love starts with the honeymoon.
Social patterns in Taiwan being what they are, women are
not usually included in their husbands’ social lives, nor do they
expect their husbands to relinquish their outside socializing in
order to spend more time with the household members.
Roughly a third of the women said that at most they went
somewhere with their husbands two or three times a year-
usually to visit relatives or attend a company banquet. Thirteen
percent insisted that never did their husbands take them
anywhere publicly. At the other end of the spectrum were the
28% who accompanied their husbands somewhere at least once
a week. This is a new pattern, since there is no stigma attached
to a man’s spending his weekends and evenings with friends
rather than family. In fact, he lays himself open to teasing and
ridicule from his peers if his wife frequently accompanies him
or if he expresses a preference for staying home at night.
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The employed wives are in a somewhat better position-at
least 40% of them claimed that their husbands sometimes took
them along when they went to visit friends, a claim that was
made by only 30% of the housewives. Employed wives also
stood a better chance of being taken out for an evening to the
movies (with or without children)-almost 70% of the working
wives reported this, compared with 56% of the housewives. And
if our coding of positive and negative affect in the husband-wife
relationship is at all meaningful, employed wives had a slight
edge in feeling that their relationships with their husbands were
satisfying and happy.
Even though I could not do a long series of increasingly
intimate interviews with the 240 women in my study, I would
say that relatively few were markedly unhappy in their
marriages. But only 40% in both groups felt that they had
companionship, affection, and emotional support from their
husbands. Another 40% had not really expected these things
and were less disappointed or were resigned to their absence:
their reason for getting married was that they had no
alternative, that a woman must get married. Having marital
status, a home, and children may be sufficient for some. For the
remaining 20%, it was not enough.
Children, of course, bring tremendous emotional consolation
as well as fill one’s time with the feeling of doing something
worthwhile. Housewives in particular feel that until the children
are in college they require a great deal of time and attention. In
the Taiwan situation they need perhaps even more attention
and time than in the American middle class. Middle-class
children in Taiwan are not expected or encouraged to play on
the street with other neighborhood youngsters during their
preschool years. This is regarded as a lower-class pattern in the
cities. Middle-class children play in the yard or in the house,
attended by their mothers and perhaps some carefully invited
young friends. Once they start school, the mother’s days are
freer, but her afternoons and evenings are busier as she becomes
involved in the task of tutoring the children and helping them
with their homework. Education is highly valued in the middle
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class, both as a stepping-stone to a career for boys and as a key
to a good marriage for girls. The intense competition in the
school system and the problems of getting into good senior high
schools and colleges are a source of concern to children and
parents alike. In the later school years, middle-class children
have tutors or attend cram schools if their work is not of top
quality. In primary school and early junior high, tutoring is the
mother’s task. Fathers participate much less often, despite their
higher levels of education-most likely because their own social
schedule precludes their being home regularly every evening.
The average tutoring time was estimated at one hour a day per
child, running higher, of course, around examination time.
These tasks place more of a burden on the housewives
because of demographic factors. Limitations on family size were
more assiduously or successfully pursued by the working wives,
half of whom had one or two children, three-quarters of whom
had three or fewer children. In contrast, 44% of the housewives
had four or more children and another 28% had at least three. If
properly spaced out, the responsibilities of motherhood can
thus stretch over some 25 or 30 years until the youngest child
enters college. And that is the span of time that most
housewives have in mind when they say, &dquo;Perhaps I will look
for a job when my youngest child is grown up.&dquo; They really
mean that they are out of the job market permanently.
Their days are spent absorbed with the children, with
household tasks, with make-work and solitary recreations. Only
eleven women in the entire sample said that in their free time
during the day they would ordinarily visit a friend. Almost all
had television sets, and almost half watched from three to five
hours a day (most of the watchers were, of course, housewives)
in their free time. Others spent their &dquo;free time&dquo; doing
handicrafts, finding additional household chores to do, playing
with the children, or reading novels and magazines.
As was said earlier in this section, there is a certain amount of
diffuse dissatisfaction and ambivalence about roles among the
women in this group. The housewives, many of whom came
from large families or smaller communities, now have to cope
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with isolation, loneliness, and a feeling that many of the tasks
they perform are boring and held in disregard-even servants
will not do them any longer.
Those who are working have found a solution to the
problems of loneliness and uselessness which most of them
consciously identify with the housewife role. But at the same
time, they are guilt ridden and anxious that they are failing to
fulfill their required roles as mothers and homemakers, even
when they are able to recruit other women as surrogates for
those tasks.
A FEMINIST STATEMENT
We have pointed to some evidences that women are not
totally convinced that the nuclear family/housewife model is
the most satisfying or worthwhile. Another kind of indicator is
the success of a relatively new magazine, The Women (Funü
zachi), which in a quiet way has addressed itself to feminist
issues. During the early 1970s it ran articles on such subjects as
the need for day-care centers, women’s legal rights, the women’s
movement in other countries, abortion and birth control, and
presented models of career women and suggestions of career
lines for women beyond the stereotypically acceptable ones. In
1972, a feminist group was formed at National Taiwan
University among students and younger faculty women, and I
am told that similar groups are quietly operating elsewhere. In
1974 a book on the &dquo;new feminism,&dquo; taking an understandably
moderate stance, was published by one of the leaders of the
National Taiwan University group (Lu, 1974). Though to those
of us who have been in the women’s movement in the United
. States the author’s criticisms of social and economic discrimi-
nation seem restrained, she has apparently been under attack
and her position interpreted to mean that she favors &dquo;open sex&dquo;
and the abolition of the family. Neither of these extreme
positions is anywhere evident in the book. Most significant is
that small number of women who manage to maintain a
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working life outside the home without being forced to it by
economic need and who support the idea of an equalitarian
marriage, despite the heavy weighting of the mass media against
these ideas. That they exist, that they continue to exist and set
an alternative model for others, is an indicator of the felt
shallowness of the role that is officially and popularly assigned
to women. However, most of the women in the Taiwan work
force are there out of necessity, and many are only temporarily
in the work force.
Despite the official proclamations that men and women
enjoy equality in Taiwan, many women suspect that this is not
the case, or are sure it is not. The disappearance of the joint and
extended family unit as a desired model fails to solve the basic
problem, which is that of women’s relationship to the rest of
humanity (men). The rejection of the complex family unit does
nothing to change the relationship between men and women in
the economic and political world, and very little to change their
relationship in the domestic sphere. The question of male
chauvinism is clouded over and hidden by the supposition that
the oppression of women within the traditional Chinese family
stemmed mainly from other women. This is not to deny the real
tensions and antagonisms that often existed between mothers-
in-law and daughters-in-law, or between sisters-in-law, but it is
possible that these have been exaggerated or overemphasized by
Western as well as Chinese scholars. The older women in the
household might in many cases identify with the young
newcomer and welcome her companionship (in some cases the
only adult female companionship available once their own
daughters married). In the case of cross-cousin marriages with
mother’s brother’s daughter, the older woman would be
welcoming her own kinswoman into the household. The crucial
role played by women in the selection of a daughter-in-law also
mitigates against the possibilities of antagonism and rivalry,
since it puts on them the responsibility for the choice. Older
women and daughters-in-law may also share an interest in the
care of the next generation, which brings the daughter-in-law
into a relationship of dependency rather than rivalry.
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The family situation described in &dquo;Gold Flower’s Story,&dquo; for
example (Belden, 1970. 275-307), makes clear that the abuse
and terror inflicted on the young woman in her marital home
stem from her husband and father-in-law and not from the
mother-in-law, who is described as a sick and passive woman.
She is beaten, starved, and denied the creature comforts, and
when the village is liberated, it is her father-in-law who is hauled
up for criticism and threats of retaliation. At the same time, we
must keep in mind that there were women so brutalized by the
treatment they received, at whoever’s hands, that they lived for
the day when they could retaliate and inflict similar suffering
on others. Inflicting it on men was impossible; but they could
turn on their adopted daughters, their daughers-in-law, or
perhaps even their own children. The mother who bound her
daughter’s feet repeated what had been done to her as a child,
despite the suffering that she knew was involved. The older
woman who abused her daughter-in-law or adopted daughter
repeated an acceptable pattern set in the past. But it was not
some natural viciousness of women-against-women operating
here. It was women as agents of male authority, helping to
create another generation of submissive and obedient wives and
mothers. The shift to the nuclear household does not axiomati-
cally change the position of women in the household. It only
shifts more of the burden of control over women to the
husband and to the society at large. To many housewives it
becomes clear that the absence of a mother-in-law does not
provide freedom from household tasks, nor does it enable them
to widen their social circle or operate in the world outside the
home. At best, it spares them a non-compatible co-resident and
simplifies some household chores while increasing others. It
does not raise their social position. In the willingness and even
eagerness of some of the employed wives in my sample to have
co-resident mothers-in-law one sees this realization more clear-
ly : the mother-in-law is not a threat to a freer life-style. On the
contrary, she can be an active supporter of it, as demonstrated
by her willingness to take on the domestic burden.
The urban nuclear family inflicts a different kind of
oppression on its women from the overt physical oppression so
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often cited for the past. It is psychological oppression that is
bound up with social isolation and the contradiction between
receiving an education and the absence of alternative ways to
put that education to use. That education is available to women
is again one of the items cited to &dquo;prove&dquo; the equality of
women in Taiwanese society. Those women who have managed
to gain a senior middle-school education are, objectively
speaking, of higher scholastic aptitude than the population of
male senior students if only because they faced stiffer competi-
tion in order to gain that level of training. With only one-third
of senior middle-school places available to women students, and
with fairly rigorous competition for admission for all (one-tenth
of primary-school students in the 1950s survived to graduate
from senior middle school, and one-fifth in the 1960s), those
women who reach even that level of education would be
justified in regarding themselves as part of the intelligentsia.
For college-educated women, the feeling of specialness is
even more justifiable. Women are again limited to a third of all
college entrants (though as a result of the examination system
they have in recent years managed to constitute almost 50% of
those accepted at National Taiwan University) and this in a
competitive system in which until recently only one in a
hundred youngsters survived to enter college or higher-level
technical schools. Yet academic excellence and progress through
the school system are no guarantee of anything. Official
government statistics suggest that a high percentage of college-
educated women (close to two-thirds) are working. However, an
attitude survey done by the sociology department at National
Taiwan University (in which 31 % of all the women were college
educated) suggested that only 44% of college women were
employed whereas all the college-educated men in the sample
were working (Chang, 1968). Social unrest would probably
ensue if only 44% of the college-educated males held employ-
ment. But in Taiwan, as elsewhere, many women accept the
traditionally assigned roles-well over half the college women in
that sample agreed that &dquo;men’s work is outside the home,
women’s work is inside.&dquo; So did 83% of the college-educated
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men in this particular survey. At the same time, only 9.7% of
the women in the total sample thought that women did not
have the same abilities as men, and 76.8% thought that a
woman could go out to work even if there were no pressing
economic reason for her to do so. It was college men in the
sample who were the most likely to think women did not have
the same abilities as men, and to be most adamant about hiring
men in preference to women. The male resistance to female
employment is strong, whether they be men in their role as
husbands, in their role as employers, or in their role as
colleagues.
Interestingly enough, it is in the most modernized area of
Taiwan that the resistance to women working is the strongest.
Proportionately, more educated women find jobs outside of
Taipei.
In Taipei, the lodestar metropolis where over a third of
Taiwan’s male college graduates have settled and found employ-
ment, there are problems for women seeking work. The women
graduates of teachers colleges and teacher-training institutes are
less employable than men. only 2,632, many of these yet
unmarried, work full- or part-time, while 3,726 are housewives.
Their male counterparts are all employed, some in nonteaching
middle-class jobs. However, outside of Taipei the situation is
considerably better for women. There we find that of the
women graduates trained as teachers, some 17,000 are working
and only 4,000 are full-time housewives. And some have found
jobs other than teaching. As for women trained in regular
universities and colleges, they too do better in the hinterland. In
Taipei, 14,643 are employed, 1,023 are listed as unemployed,
and 4,239 are housewives. Outside of Taipei, 19,000 are
employed and 4,000 are housewives. Moreover, in Taipei 86%
of the college women employed are under 25 years of age, while
outside Taipei the figure drops to 70%, suggesting that more
women there remain at work after marriage. On the Taipei
scene, women graduates of senior vocational and technical
schools do find work, but half of those employed are under 20.
Outside of Taipei only 30% of these employed graduates are
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under 20. As for graduates of senior middle schools, in Taipei
they are clearly disadvantaged. Only 6,374 are employed,
compared with 20,636 who are housewives and another 3,000
who describe themselves as unemployed or unable to work or
disinterested. But outside of Taipei, while 26,000 are house-
wives, there are 21,000 who are employed (see the October
1970 Quarterly Report on the Labor Force Survey).
How do we explain these statistics? One possibility is that
with the flight of male talent to the metropolis, women
elsewhere have an easier time finding employment. Another
possibility is that with the lesser concentration of mainlanders
outside of Taipei the adherence to the KMT thinking about
women is weaker. One way they cannot be explained is in terms
of lower salaries outside of Taipei encouraging men to allow
their wives to work. The high cost of living in the metropolis
more than wipes out any advantages of higher pay: it is males in
Taipei, if anywhere, who should be more eager to have their
. wives working to bring in additional income.
To return from this slightly tedious digression into figures, let
us again address the question of access to education as an
indicator of equality for women. It should be clear that
education in itself does little, or at least it is not, in and of
itself, a solution. Many of those who have received educations
suiting them for middle-class types of jobs are in fact not using
their educations to that end. This reflects the ideological
continuity in the Kuomintang since the inception of the New
Life Movement as regards the purpose of education for women.
Briefly stated, that viewpoint holds that educated women make
better wives and mothers, better householders and citizens. The
major purpose in educating women is to enable them to teach
and rear their children more effectively. As mothers, they can
provide not only the moral training but also the educational
input which will ensure success for the children as they move
. through the school system. As such, education expands the
domestic role rather than being a tool by which women are
enabled to take a place in the wider society. This is an obvious
break with the spirit of the May Fourth Movement and the
earlier days of the KMT revolution.
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Education also becomes an end in itself as a symbol of elite
status. It is one factor in defining the social position of a
household. Women can draw considerable consolation from this
as well as from the idea that the housewife/mother role is
upgraded through its educational input. But operating con-
comitantly with these positive ideas is the feeling that even with
education women are less able and less talented than men. This
feeling has manifested itself in recent years in the public
discussions over the high rates of examination success of women
in gaining admission to National Taiwan University. The general
thrust of the discussions is that women students are simply
better equipped for blind memorization of texts and classroom
material. Their high scores, in effect, are to be taken as
indicators not of scholastic ability and creativity but only of
their more submissive, obedient, and/or compulsive &dquo;nature.&dquo;
In the past couple of years, arguments against academic and job
training for women have gained force. Recent proposals have
seriously suggested cutting back female college admissions by
two-thirds of the present level, a suggestion which if put into
effect now would bring women’s college enrollment to 10% of
the total. Only the truly exceptional and outstanding women
would ever enter college. At the same time, it has been
proposed that the senior middle school and junior colleges
concentrate on expanding their home-economics programs as a
major course of study. Thus, women can have the symbolic
prestige of a degree in a field specifically preparing them for
marriage. Combined with this are suggestions for reducing the
vocational and commercial senior middle-school facilities for
women in order to further reduce possible competition for
white-collar jobs (see Tsui et al., 1972).
Finally, we return to the assumption that male-female
equality is achieved through basing marriage on love, mutual
attraction, and choice, which, whatever the realities may be, is
the way that modern marriages are defined in Taiwan (as in
most other parts of the industrial world). Although these
elements may be necessary to an equalitarian relationship
between husbands and wives, they are not sufficient to ensure
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equality for women either within the domestic unit or outside
of it. They are, alas, not even sufficient to ensure domestic
happiness over the course of the years. As my own data and
that of others have indicated, there is often emotional distance
between spouses, lack of trust, and separate lives even when the
ideal of the marriage-by-choice and nuclear family has been
reached. A quick survey through the various publications aimed
at women, be they private or government sponsored, shows that
they tend to lay the major blame for domestic dissatisfactions
on the woman herself, burdening her with guilt and anxiety.
This again is a psychological form of oppression.
Only in a limited sense is there equality within the domestic
sphere. Women do have a measure of control over household
expenditures and within limits can allocate their time to
different tasks as they choose. Because they are often the only
adults in constant interaction with the children, they have
authority to discipline them and have more of a say in the
children’s activities and future course. As a result of changes in
the legal system, they have property rights and can deter the
husband from bringing an additional sex-partner into the
household because the household is defined as being as much
the wife’s as it is the husband’s.
However, since they also operate as extensions of their
husbands’ interests, they are not free to form friendship
alliances for themselves. And since they are not seen as full
adults, they do not have to be incorporated into the husbands’
networks of friendships and social activities anymore than the
children have to be incorporated. Looked at in this light,
women are the foremost of the children and men are the
foremost of the total household.
The real social isolation of many of the middle-class
housewives gives the lie to the promise that love-marriages and
small-family living provide all the emotional gratification that
an adult woman would need. Some survive emotionally by
devoting all their energies and interests to the children and by
having a fairly large number of children in order to increase the
mother-role. Some become religious activists. Others take refuge
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in magazines, pulp novels, and more recently, television, and
exist in a fantasy world of love stories and trying situations
which come out all right in the end. Some go insane according
to Chu Hung-ming (1972), the highest rates of schizophrenia in
Taiwan occur among female mainland Chinese, while Taiwanese
women who have migrated to the urban centers are way ahead
in the prevalence of psychoneuroses and manic-depressive
behavior, with a steady and large rise between the ages of 30
and 60 (from 19 per thousand to 93 per thousand). In terms of
all mental disorders, women clearly hold the lead whether they
be Taiwanese in their hometowns, migrant Taiwanese, or
mainlanders.
The solution to the problem is not that husbands spend more
time at home (as prescribed by the &dquo;togetherness&dquo; philosophy
so popular in the United States in the 1950s) but that women
spend less time within the confines of the domestic world, as
defined in the narrow sense. All the ethnographic evidence
strongly suggests that it is only very recently that women in
Taiwan society have borne so much of the responsibility alone
for child care and domestic tasks. In the peasant sector, women
participated to some extent in farm work, fishing, handicrafts,
and marketing activities. They were able to do so because of
help from children and older household members with domestic
tasks and child care and because of child-care exchanges with
neighbors. The wealthier classes had servants and kinswomen
who also provided company of an adult sort.
Certainly women today could feel less isolated if the social
patterns of the city were somewhat different-if neighborhoods
were homogeneous enough in terms of social class to encourage
neighborly interactions, if there were parks where mothers
congregated with their children, if there were social and
religious organizations for women or some form of community
organization, and if married women could easily build new
social networks for themselves through their husband’s friends.
But even that does not solve all the problems, and in the
absence of these, outside employment remains the most
effective way for reducing their social isolation and bolstering
their self-esteem.
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Yet, increasingly, the option of suitable outside employment
is less available for middle-class women. The occupations still
open to women conflict with middle-class status: obviously,
those women educated at the middle-school level and beyond
have no interest in them. Social class (and age) excludes them.
Alogether, women are about 36% of the total labor force in
Taiwan. This figure includes women in agriculture, fisheries, and
family shops. In 1971, 38% of all factory workers were women,
and half of them were under 19 years of age. Forty-six percent
of what are classified as &dquo;service, sports, and recreation
workers&dquo; are women-that category includes prostitutes, bar-
girls, dance-hall girls, wine-house hostesses, hot-springs at-
tendants, massage-parlor and beauty-parlor personnel, hotel
workers, and so on. There are also possibilities that carry
somewhat more social respectability, such as salespersons, of
which women make up 34% of the total, but here the
preference is still for young unmarried women. The same is true
of clerical workers, where women make up 32% of the total.
The jobs for which women are most eagerly recruited are based
on low levels of skill and education and/or short-term employ-
ment prior to marriage Only 5% of all women have obtained
jobs that are classified as professional, technical administrative,
or managerial, and there they constitute at most 23.5% of these
workers despite their large numbers in teaching and nursing. In
brief, employment may not be a viable alternative for women
who wish to do something beyond the housewife role.
In an earlier paper (Diamond, 1973a) I raised the point
originally discussed by Boserup (1970) that greater involvement
of women in the work force has its positive aspects, rather than
the often-assumed negative one of creating unemployment for
men. One of the advantages of employing women throughout
the labor force is that it puts a brake on rural-urban migration,
keeping some educated persons in the rural areas and smaller
cities and towns to spearhead progress. In addition, it relieves
the pressure on public investment in the growing cities to
provide housing, electricity, water, sanitation, schools, hos-
pitals, and the like. Two-income households pay more in taxes
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and also have more money for consumer spending and savings.
Households with employed wives also tend to have lower birth
rates. The net effect is that urbanization proceeds at a slower
pace with less of a gap between metropolis and hinterland, and
with less strain and dislocation. I think there is no doubt that
the adjustment of male household heads to modem urban living
has been relatively smooth (aside from certain tensions over the
high cost of living and the difficulties of stretching a single
salary to meet all family needs). Little has been said about the
effects of modem urban living on the wives of these men, and
since society encompasses all members, it would be fair to say
that the new life-styles are difficult and sometimes quite painful
for half of the adult population.
The government in Taiwan, however, is not interested in
filling the work force with working couples. Governmental
planning tends to equate &dquo;development&dquo; with rapid urban
growth and concentration. It also tends to equate &dquo;develop-
ment&dquo; with the growing numbers of foreign-owned factories
and corporations, even when the profits from these leave the
country while the goods they produce are locally available only
if channeled back through foreign markets at greatly increased
price. The main attraction for these enterprises is the availa-
bility of a work force whose individual salaries rarely exceed
$30 a month for a 48-hour week with no threat of strikes or
labor-union pressure. Much of this labor is supplied by women.
Urging young women into the lower ranks of the work force
helps meet the goal of rapid industrialization-never mind
whose industry it is. Reserving the jobs in the middle and upper
ranks of the work force for men helps meet the goal of rapid
urbanization: for each man hired in the metropolis the
population is increased by one woman and several children.
Taipei continues to grow at an alarming rate, with all the
practical problems of a &dquo;boom town,&dquo; including inadequate
facilities for children.
One social service that is conspicuously missing is adequate
child-care service for those women who can locate jobs and may
wish to work. Servants are difficult to find because of the large
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numbers of young women drawn into industry, sales work, and
entertainment Kindergarten facilities, public and private com-
bined, can accommodate only one in ten potential applicants,
and there are even fewer facilities for children under the age of
four. Moreover, children attending kindergarten and the early
grades of elementary school are often on half-day shifts which
do not coincide with business working hours. After-school play
centers are rare, except in private schools. Despite government
assertions that no occupation is denied to women, the realities
of the situation are such that it is increasingly difficult for
married women with children to take employment. That so
many devise ways to do so, in face of the difficulties, and often
in the absence of any pressing economic reasons for doing so, is
a testament to their strength, determination, and need.
It is obvious that in comparison with their sisters on the
mainland of China, the women of Taiwan are in a disadvantaged
position. In Taiwan only the content of women’s oppression has
changed since traditional times, enabling some to create
life-styles that give them autonomy, dignity, and a more equal
status both in the home and in society at large. But for many
life contains a new form of oppression. Though educated and
qualified to participate in economic, social, and political life,
they are discouraged from doing so by both formal and
informal means of control.
The decline of feminist aspirations, their absence from the
published and proclaimed programs and goals of government-
approved women’s organizations, is not the fault of the women.
The retreat into domesticity stems only in part from the
backlog of traditional beliefs about women which defined them
as less able, less talented, and less strong than men and which
defined their role as &dquo;inside the house.&dquo; The terms neiren
and neizi are still used in Taiwan in reference to wives. The
official line on women sees them in domestic and supportive
roles once they are married. Little is done to make other
alternatives viable, and even more, those who take on a
different life-style are subject to criticism and vulnerable to
feelings of guilt. If they have children, they are made to feel
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anxious and ashamed by charges of selfishness and unmaternal
feelings. That too is a form of oppression.
One final comment- the position of women in Taiwan (or
any other developing country) cannot be understood simply by
looking at the traditional base and asking what markable
changes and continuities there are in the present or what has
been borrowed from the West. It is necessary to bring into the
picture the political and economic changes that have occurred
in recent years and to see how they are related to the directions
that the changes and continuities have taken.
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